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Abstract. Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices
to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security
is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements
that we use in order to keep messages secure. Because of the constrained
nature of these environments, it is necessary to use algorithms that do
not require high computational power. Lightweight ciphers are therefore
ideal candidates for this purpose.
In this paper, we explore a possibility of attacking an ultra-lightweight
cipher PRESENT by using a multiple fault attack. Utilizing the Differ-
ential Fault Analysis technique, we were able to recover the secret key
with two faulty encryptions and an exhaustive search of 216 remaining
key bits. Our attack aims at four nibbles in the penultimate round of
the cipher, causing faulty output in all nibbles of the output. We also
provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT)
technique for the proposed fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
Keywords: Fault Attack, PRESENT, FPGA, Hardware Trojan
1 Introduction
Internet of Things brings new challenges into the security field. With inter-
connection of a huge number of small devices with constrained computational
capabilities, there is a need to design algorithms and protocols simple enough
to be run on such devices within a reasonable time frame yet still preserving
high level of security. Lightweight cryptography provides algorithms that use
operations fulfilling such requirements. It delivers adequate security and does
not always lower the security-efficiency ratio [15]. Currently there are many
lightweight cryptography algorithms available, providing various security levels
and encryption speed [11]. For the further work we have chosen the PRESENT
algorithm.
PRESENT is an ultra-lightweight block cipher, introduced by Bogdanov et
al. in 2007 [4]. The algorithm was standardized in 2011, by the ISO/IEC 29192-
2:2011 standard. It is based on SP-network, therefore uses three operations in
each round – 4-bit non-linear substitution, bit permutation and xor with the
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key. The best cryptanalysis presented so far is a truncated differential attack on
26 out of 31 rounds presented in 2014 [3].
Fault attacks exploit a possibility to change the intermediate values in the
algorithm execution so that it can radically reduce the key search space or even
reveal the key. The first attack was proposed by Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton in
1996 [5], following by the practical attack by Biham and Shamir one year later
[2].
Currently, fault analysis is a popular method to attack cryptographic imple-
mentations, utilizing clock/voltage glitch techniques, diode laser and ION beam
irradiation, EM pulse, or hardware trojans. For attacking symmetric block ci-
phers, the most popular technique is Differential Fault Analysis (DFA), in which
the fault is usually inserted in the last rounds of a cipher for observing differences
between correct and faulty ciphertexts. Other techniques include Collision Fault
Analysis (CFA), Ineffective Fault Analysis (IFA), Safe-Error Analysis (SEA)
[7,8]. We have chosen DFA as our attack technique, with inserting multiple faults
in the penultimate round of PRESENT cipher.
In our work we present a novel multiple fault attack on PRESENT. By
injecting four nibble-switch faults in the penultimate round we were able to
recover the secret key with only two faulty ciphertexts and an exhaustive search
of 216 remaining bits of the key. In both faulty ciphertexts, it is necessary to
flip different nibbles in order to produce a different fault mask in the last round.
We provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT)
technique for fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of known fault attacks on PRESENT cipher and Section 3 describes this cipher
in details. Our attack model is proposed in Section 4 and HT implementation of
our attack is described in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes our work and
provides motivation for further research.
2 Related Work
The first DFA attack on PRESENT was published in 2010 by G. Wang and S.
Wang [22]. Their attack aimed at a single nibble and they were able to recover
the secret key with the computational complexity of 229 by using 64 pairs of
correct and faulty cipher texts on average.
Zhao et al. [23] proposed a fault-propagation pattern based DFA and demon-
strated this technique on PRESENT and PRINT ciphers. The attack on PRESENT-
80 and PRESENT-128 uses 8 and 16 faulty cipher texts on average, respectively,
and reduces the master key search space to 214.7 and 221.1.
Gu et al. [12] used a combination of differential fault analysis and statistical
cryptanalysis techniques to attack lightweight block ciphers. They tested their
methodology on PRESENT-80 and PRINT-48. The attack on PRESENT is
aimed at middle rounds of algorithm, using single random S-box and multiple
S-boxes fault attack. The main outcome of the paper is an extension of the fault
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model from the usual fault model, which aims at ultimate or penultimate rounds,
to the other rounds as well.
Bagheri et al. [1] presented two DFA attacks on PRESENT, the first one
attacks a single bit and the second one attacks a single nibble of the intermediate
state. They were able to recover the secret key with 18 faulty cipher texts on
average, using the second attack.
The most efficient attack so far was proposed by Jeong et al. [13]. They
used a 2-byte random fault model, attacking the algorithm state after round 28.
For PRESENT-80, they needed two 2-byte faults and for PRESENT-128 they
needed three 2-byte faults and an exhaustive search of 222.3 on average.
Hardware Trojans have drawn much attention during the past decade due
to their severity in security-sensitive embedded systems [9]. As an enormous
network of diverse embedded devices, Internet of Things (IoT) is populated with
a great number of ICs, to collect, encrypt, transmit, and store data. For each node
inside an IoT system, a complete functional chip normally consists of sorts of
IPs, and they are typically designed and manufactured by off-shore design houses
or foundries. In theory, any parties involving into the design or manufacturing
stages can make alterations in the circuits for malicious purposes [16] [18]. These
tiny changes or extra logic can hide inside the system during the majority of its
lifetime until a specific activation mechanism is awaken for pilfering secrets or
impairing the main functionality.
As a typical stealthy modification to ICs, a Hardware Trojan (either named
Trojan Horse) was intentionally integrated into embedded devices for disabling
or destroying a system, leaking confidential information from side channels, or
triggering critical faults [19] [17] [14]. HT can be implanted into the circuit at
multiple stages with a stealthy nature. The post-manufacturing testing often fail
to detect it since Trojan only influences the circuit under specific conditions [6].
At a proper future time, the Trojan can be activated. Unlikely to the counterpart
Software Trojan (ST), HT cannot be removed by upgrading the software in each
device. So HT is truly furtive and ineradicable which hence poses more serious
threat to the system security, particularly to the cryptographic blocks inside the
IoT system. HT basically consists of two components: (a) the trigger signal that
performs to activate the inserted trojan, and (b) the payload that is affected
by the trojan [20]. Actually, many solutions have been proposed for detecting
the implanted trojans, such as the fine-grained optical inspections [21] and the
side-channel based comparison with the fully trustworthy “golden chip”. To
increase the difficulties of HT detection, the trojan size is preferably to be as
small as possible, w.r.t its host design. In this paper, a compact Trojan module
is presented which serves to inject multiple faults into specific algorithmic points
in PRESENT cipher, which makes the proposed multiple fault attack approach
realistic in practices.
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3 Overview of PRESENT Cipher
PRESENT is a symmetric block cipher, based on SP-network. It consists of
31 rounds, block length is 64 bits and it supports keys with lengths of 80 and
128 bits. Considering the usage purposes, authors recommend the 80 bit key
length version. Each round consists of three operations: XOR with the round
key, substitution by the 4-bit S-box (Table 1), and bit permutation (Table 2).
At the end of the cipher, a post-whitening XOR with the key is performed, so
there are 32 generated keys in total. A high-level overview of the encryption
process is stated in Figure 1.
Plaintext
Ciphertext
addRoundKey
addRoundKey
31x sBoxLayer
pLayer
Fig. 1. High-level overview of operations in PRESENT block cipher.
Table 1. PRESENT S-box.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S(x) C 5 6 B 9 0 A D 3 E F 8 4 7 1 2
Key schedule of 80-bit version of the algorithm is following. First, a secret key
is stored in register K and represented as k79k78 . . . k0. Since the block length is
64 bits, only 64 leftmost bits are used for each round. Therefore, at round i we
have:
Ki := κ63κ62 . . . κ0 = k79k78 . . . k16.
After every round, key register K is updated in a following way:
1. [k79k78 . . . k1k0] = [k18k17 . . . k20k19]
2. [k79k78k77k76] = S[k79k78k77k76]
3. [k19k18k17k16k15] = [k19k18k17k16k15]⊕RC
where RC is a round counter.
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Table 2. PRESENT permutation layer.
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P(i) 0 16 32 48 1 17 33 49 2 18 34 50 3 19 35 51
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
P(i) 4 20 36 52 5 21 37 53 6 22 38 54 7 23 39 55
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
P(i) 8 24 40 56 9 25 41 57 10 26 42 58 11 27 43 59
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
P(i) 12 28 44 60 13 29 45 61 14 30 46 62 15 31 47 63
4 Attack Model
PRESENT algorithm uses sixteen 4-bit S-boxes. The output of S-boxes is an
input for the permutation layer. The attack exploits following properties of the
algorithm:
– Output of one S-box is an input for four different S-boxes.
– Input of one S-box consists of outputs from four different S-boxes.
– There are four different groups of S-boxes:
• The outputs of S-boxes 0-3 are inputs for S-boxes 0,4,8,12,
• The outputs of S-boxes 4-7 are inputs for S-boxes 1,5,9,13,
• The outputs of S-boxes 8-11 are inputs for S-boxes 2,6,10,14,
• The outputs of S-boxes 12-15 are inputs for S-boxes 3,7,11,15.
If it is possible to corrupt the whole output of some S-box (flip four bits), the
fault will spread into four S-boxes in the following round, affecting the same bit
position in every S-box. Therefore if we aim at four S-boxes from distinct groups
in round 30, the fault will be distributed to every S-box in round 31. This fact
is depicted in Figure. 2.
4.1 Attack Steps
The attack steps are following:
1. The attacker inserts four 4-bit faults at the output of four S-boxes from
distinct groups.
2. She computes difference tables according to the fault model. More specifi-
cally, the bit faults in S31i,j , where i ∈ 0, .., 15 are S-boxes of round 31 and
j ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3 are bits of particular S-box are following:
– Fault at S300 , S
30
4 , S
30
8 , S
30
12 will result to faults at S
31
i,0.
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Fig. 2. Fault propagation after attacking four S-boxes.
– Fault at S301 , S
30
5 , S
30
9 , S
30
13 will result to faults at S
31
i,1.
– Fault at S302 , S
30
6 , S
30
10 , S
30
14 will result to faults at S
31
i,2.
– Fault at S303 , S
30
7 , S
30
11 , S
30
15 will result to faults at S
31
i,3.
Those difference tables contain the fault mask (bit position of a fault) and
the output mask, which is the difference of the S-box output of a correct and
faulty input. As an example, for masks 1000 and 0100, Table 3 shows these
values.
3. Using a formula 1, the attacker observes the output differences and she
searches for possible S31 input candidates.
4. She repeats steps 1-3, inserting fault in different nibbles, which will result to
attacking different S-box bits at S31.
5. Shee compares the possible candidate sets from both attacks, the intersection
of these sets gives exactly one candidate, which is the correct state before
S31.
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6. After obtaining all the key nibbles of K31, the attacker uses an exhaustive
search on the rest of the key, so the search space is 216.
∆ = P−1(C ′)⊕ P−1(C) (1)
4.2 Attack Example
After obtaining the faulty ciphertext and inverting the last round permutation
layer, it is possible to obtain information about the input of the substitution
layer. Let us assume that we attacked the first nibble after the S-box operation
in round 30. Therefore the faulty mask of inputs of S-boxes 0,4,8,12 in round 31
will be 1000. We can now observe the changes in the output of the algorithm.
Table 3 shows every possible input and output of the S-box operation, together
with the faulty one, after attacking the most significant bit. It is easy to see that
in the worst case, we have narrowed the input candidates to four numbers. For
example, for the output difference 1111, we have input candidates 0, 7, 8, 9. The
notation is following:
– I is a correct input of the S-box.
– I’ is a faulty input of the S-box.
– O is a correct output of the S-box.
– O’ is a faulty output of the S-box.
– ∆ is the output difference between the correct and the faulty output.
The second step of the attack is to change the attacked nibble, so that it will
affect another output nibble of the S-box belonging to the same group as the
first one. Let us assume, we attacked the second nibble of the S-box output in
round 30. Therefore the input of the same S-boxes in round 31 will be changed,
but the faulty mask will be 0100 in this case. The outputs for this case are
stated in table 3. It is easy to see that the groups of the input values producing
the same differences after the fault are not overlapping with the first attack,
therefore we can determine the input value with certainty. For example if the
output difference in this case would be 0101, the possible input candidates are 0,
1, 4, 5. The only common number for both attacks is 0, therefore it is the input
value for the given S-box.
Using the simplified attack model with only one faulty nibble, it is possible to
reveal the last round key with 8 faulty encryptions, since it is necessary to attack
two distinct nibbles of each of four groups of S-boxes. If there is a possibility to
inject multiple faults per encryption, the last round key could be revealed with
2 encryptions. In each run, the attacker would inject the fault into one nibble
of the S-box output of four different groups, changing the nibbles after the first
run. In both cases, an exhaustive search of 216 is required to obtain the whole
PRESENT-80 key.
5 Hardware Trojan for Practical Fault Injection
In this section, an FPGA implemented PRESENT cipher for the described mul-
tiple fault analysis approach will be detailed. The hardware realization relies
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Table 3. Faults and differences with fault masks 1000 and 0100.
Mask 1000
I I’ O O’ ∆
0 8 C 3 1111
1 9 5 E 1011
2 A 6 F 1001
3 B B 8 0011
4 C 9 4 1101
5 D 0 7 0111
6 E A 1 1011
7 F D 2 1111
8 0 3 C 1111
9 1 E 5 1011
A 2 F 6 1001
B 3 8 B 0011
C 4 4 9 1101
D 5 7 0 0111
E 6 1 A 1011
F 7 2 D 1111
Mask 0100
I I’ O O’ ∆
0 4 C 9 0101
1 5 5 0 0101
2 6 6 A 1100
3 7 B D 0110
4 0 9 C 0101
5 1 0 5 0101
6 2 A 6 1100
7 3 D B 0110
8 C 3 4 0111
9 D E 7 1001
A E F 1 1110
B F 8 2 1010
C 8 4 3 0111
D 9 7 E 1001
E A 1 F 1110
F B 2 8 1010
on a Spartan-6 FPGA (XC6SLX4), soldered on Diligent Cmod-S6 commercial
board [10]. We mounted the injections using the hardmacro-based Hardware Tro-
jan (HT) [19] by inserting specially created trojan modules into the algorithmic
networks in FPGA scenario.
5.1 FPGA Scenario
Field Programmed Gate Array (FPGA) has been widely utilized in almost all
digital/hybrid logic applications due to its rapid implementation, low cost and
high performance. The major advantage of hardware implementation for cipher
lies within its parallel computation networks that allow multiple logic chains
computed in parallel, which results in high computational speed compared to
the microcontroller scenarios. In our work, PRESENT cipher was implemented
inside a compact Spartan-6 FPGA. The cipher is structured in loops with 16 4-bit
S-boxes in parallel. The complete encryption is clocked with a global clock signal
and the intermediate values from each round are stored in 128 1-bit registers.
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So a complete encryption in out implementation consists of 32 clock cycles, as
seen in Figure 3.
pLayer4 bit
S-box 0
S-box 15registers
bitxor
64 bit
64 bit
64 bit
64 bit
64 bit
round controller ciphertext
plaintext
round keys
multiple fault injection
Fig. 3. Parallel Present block cipher in FPGA.
5.2 Hardware Trojan for Fault Injection
HT typically requires some trigger signals to activate the inserted trojan mod-
ules. By the principle of the proposed multiple fault injection, a 1 bit signal of
trojan trigger is activated at the 30th encryption round when the fault pertur-
bation is required. Since the injection point is at the output of the S-box, the
specially devised trojan hardmacro for S-boxes 0, 4, 8, 12, and for S-boxes 1,
5, 9, 13 can be inserted during the chip fabrication or at the off-the-shelf stage.
The payload is highlighted in the grey box of Figure 4. Signal of the flip trigger
is used to control the injection into different S-box groups. Since only 2 injection
rounds are needed for the proposed fault attack, another 1 bit signal is enough.
So there are totally 2 bit signals acting as the trigger in this solution. In Spartan-
6 FPGA, every slice consists of 4 look-up tables (LUT), 8 multiplexers and 8
flip-flops. Even each LUT can either be used as one 6-input 1-output Boolean
function or two 5-input 1-output functions, only 4 multiplexers in each slice has
an external input that we have to use as the 1 input bit of the XOR gate and
the input of multiplexer after the XOR gate. Therefore one slice can actually
implement 4 HT modules, and 8 extra slices, i.e., 4 Configurable Logic Blocks
(CLBs), are sufficient for inserting all the 8 trojans. The states of the 2-bit trig-
ger signals are given in Table 4. It is emphasized that the insertion of trojan can
as well apply to different S-box groups, just obeying the principles explained in
Section 4.
6 Conclusions
In our paper we have proposed a multiple fault injection attack on PRESENT
cipher, using DFA technique. By flipping four nibbles in the penultimate round
we were able to obtain the secret key using two faulty ciphertext and an exhaus-
tive search of a 216 bits. We have implemented a hardware trojan, causing this
type of fault on an FPGA implementation of PRESENT.
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XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
XOR
S0
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
flip_trigger => 
‘0’: bit flip for Sbox 0,4,8,12 
‘1’: bit flip for Sbox 1,5,9,13
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
trojan_trigger => 
‘0’: normal encryption 
‘1’: enable trojan
trojan_trigger
flip_trigger
Inserted HT 
module
Fig. 4. Trojans inserted into the signal paths after specific S-boxes.
Table 4. Trojan Trigger State.
trojan trigger
‘0’ ‘1’
flip trigger
‘0’
encryption
1st insertion
‘1’ 2nd insertion
There are two other possible attack scenarios. The first one is flipping more
than 4 bits, therefore the attack would affect the following nibble as well. In
this case, more than one bit of particular S-box in round 31 will be affected.
The attack can be still executed in the same way, only the differential table for
the concrete fault mask has to be computed. It can be shown, that intersection
of arbitrary two masks from two distinct differential tables gives exactly one
candidate in every case, so it is possible to use multiple-bit fault masks.
The other scenario is flipping less than 4 bits in one nibble. In this case, the
fault doesn’t spread into every S31 S-box. The solution for this scenario is to use
more faults, therefore the number of encryptions will increase.
The hardware trojan approach supporting the proposed multiple fault attack
relies on the hardmacro based HT modules to be inserted into the outputs of
specific S-boxes. In our tested Spartan-6 FPGA, only 4 CLBs are sufficient to
implement the 8 trojan modules combined with 2 bit global trigger signal. Since
the trojan blocks are inserted into the signal path of specific S-box outputs,
without altering the main functionality of the ciphers, the trojan can be mounted
at almost all design stages, such as front-end HDL coding or netlist alteration,
as well as back-end layout or sub-gate manipulation.
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In the subsequent work, we would like to focus on the realistic trojan insertion
using the proposed multiple fault analysis into the security modules of an IoT
scenario, and the related HT detection technique will also be emphasized.
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